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Introduction
With the advance of computer hardware technology, efficient model checking algorithms [4] have been devised and then model checkers such as SMV [6] and SPIN [6] have been developed. Model checkers can be used to verify fully automatically that given systems have desired properties, provided that the systems should be modeled as finite-state machines. SAL [1, 2] is a toolkit for analyzing state machines, providing several tools. Unlike other existing model checkers, each of which usually implements one model checking algorithm, SAL includes five different model checkers. The five different model checkers are symbolic, bounded, infinite bounded, witness and explicit-state model checkers (SMC, BMC, infBMC, WMC and EMC, respectively). Users can select the most appropriate one among the five different model checkers for their problems.
The Suzuki-Kasami algorithm [9] is a distributed mutual exclusion algorithm. We have analyzed the algorithm in a semi-formal way [7] with respect to the mutual exclusion property and the lockout (starvation) freedom property. In the analysis, we have found a hidden assumption that is needed to make the algorithm lockout free. The assumption is that each node must try to enter its critical section infinitely often. In a distributed setting where some nodes try to enter their critical sections only finitely often, however, it is not guaranteed that the algorithm is lockout free.
In this paper, we report on a case study in which SAL model checkers have been used to analyze the SuzukiKasami algorithm with respect to the two properties. SMC has concluded that a finite-state model of the algorithm has the mutual exclusion property, but has found a counterexample to the lockout freedom property. The counterexample has led to one possible modification that makes the algorithm lockout free. The modification makes the algorithm lockout free even if some nodes try to enter their critical sections only finitely often. We have also used infBMC to prove that an infinite-state model of the algorithm has the mutual exclusion property by -induction [3] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines SAL. Section 3 describes the Suzuki-Kasami algorithm. Section 4 models the Suzuki-Kasami algorithm as a transition system. Section 5 specifies the transition system in SAL. Section 6 checks if a finite-state model of the Suzuki-Kasami algorithm has the mutual exlusion and lockout freedom properties with SMC. Section 7 verifies that an infinite-state model of the Suzuki-Kasami algorithm has the mutual exlusion property with infBMC by -induction. Section 8 finally concludes the paper.
SAL: Symbolic Analysis Laboratory
SAL [1, 2] (see sal.csl.sri.com) provides the five different model checkers (SMC, BMC, infBMC, WMC and EMC). EMC is not provided by SAL 2.3, but will be included in a future release of SAL. SMC, BMC, WMC and EMC deal with state machines defined over finite data types, while infBMC can also handle infinite data types such as integers. SMC, BMC, infBMC and EMC checks if assertions written in LTL hold for state machines, while WMC can handle assertions in CTL. BMC uses a propositional SAT solver to find counterexamples no longer than some specified depth. It can also verify that finite state machines have LTL properties by -induction [3] . By default, SAL uses ICS [5] (Integrated Canonizer and Solver; see www.icansolve.com) as its SAT solver. For infinite state machines, infBMC can do what BMC does.
The SAL language consists of a type system and four languages for expressions, transition relations, modules and contexts. The SAL's type system and expression language are similar to those of PVS [8] (see pvs.csl.sri.com). Transition relations can be specified using both guarded commands and SMV-style variable-wise invariants. A state machine is written as a module that can have parameters. A module basically consists of a section of variable declarations, an initialization section and a section of transition relations. Modules can be composed both synchronously and asynchronously to generate compound state machines. Contexts include type declarations, function definitions, modules and assertions. Contexts can have parameters that are type and variable declarations. The assertion language is not primitive in SAL but is defined in libraries associated with the model checker concerned.
The Suzuki-Kasami Algorithm
Let us consider a computer network consisting of a fixed number, say AE´ ½µ, of nodes. The nodes have no memory in common and can communicate only by exchanging messages. The distributed mutual exclusion problem is to solve a mutual exclusion requirement for such a computer network, namely to allow at most one node to stay in its critical section at any given moment. The Suzuki-Kasami algorithm [9] is a distributed algorithm solving the problem. The algorithm may be called SKDMXA in this paper. The basic idea in the algorithm is to transfer the privilege for entering the critical sections. Figure 1 to all other nodes. When it receives a privilege message privilege(queue,ln), it enters the critical section. When it finishes executing the critical section, it sets ln[ ] to its current sequence number rn[ ], indicating that the current request has been granted, and updates queue, namely that identifiers of nodes that want to enter their critical sections and are not in the queue yet are added to the queue. After that, if queue is not empty, node sets have privilege to false and sends the privilege message privilege(get(queue),ln) to the node found in the front of the queue, where get(queue) is the queue obtained by deleting the top element from queue. Otherwise, node keeps the privilege. Finally node sets requesting to false and leaves procedure P1.
Whenever request( ,Ò) is delivered to node , node executes its own procedure P2. But, procedure P2 has to be atomically executed. 
Modeling SKDMXA
The algorithm is modeled as a transition system Ë Ä Å AE includes variables denoting the network. How to model the network in SAL will be described in the coming section.
Whenever node executes procedure P1, the sequence number ÖÒ is incremented. Therefore, in order to make the state space of the transition system Ë Ä Å AE ËÃ finite, the number of requests made by each node should be finite, say Å´ ½µ. ÒÙÑ Ó Ö Õ is used to allow node to make at most Å requests.
The transitions exhaustively and exclusively correspond to parts of the algorithm. The first 12 kinds of transitions are given labels (rem, l1, l2, l3, l4, ll5, cs, l6, l7, l8, l9 and l10, respectively). Ô is set to one of the labels.
We describe (1) the effective condition of each transition and (2) how the transition changes variables in Î Ä Å AE ËÃ when the transition is applied; variables that the transition does not change may not be described explicitly. For each variable Ú, Ú and Ú ¼ denote the values before and after a transition, respectively. 
in SAL
We describe how to specify Ë Ä Å AE ËÃ in SAL, specifically how to encode queues in more basic types, how to model the network and how to specify the behavior of each node.
Encoding Queues
Since recursive data types cannot be used in SAL specifications to be model checked, queues should be encoded in more basic types. Arrays and integers are used to encode queues. Type Queue is declared as a record type whose fields are data and tl as follows: Given an instance q of Queue, the L spaces from q.data [1] to q.data[L] are used to store queue elements; q.data [1] is always the top element of the queue if the queue is not empty; q.tl points the space where an element will be put next if the queue is not full and therefore q.data[q.tl -1] is always the last element of the queue if the queue is not empty. We declare 9 functions related to Queue, which are new empty queue returning the empty queue, full? checking if a given queue is full, empty? checking if a given queue is empty, in? checking if a given queue includes a given element, in aux? that is an auxiliary function for in?, top returning the top element of a given queue, put returning the queue obtained by putting a given element into a given queue at the end, get returning the queue obtained by deleting the top element of a given queue, and get aux that is an auxiliary function for get.
In this paper, we only show the definitions of in aux?, in?, get aux and get: In the first definition of in aux?, since the value of L is given in advance and is not mutable, the value of L+1 can be determined statically.
Modeling the Network
For each kind of message and each ordered´ µ pair of nodes, we use a cell with which node sends to node one message of this kind. For each kind of message, we then use an array whose elements are arrays of messages of this kind. Since there are two kinds of messages, request and privilege messages, we use two such arrays to model the network.
In a module called node where the behavior of each node is written, we use two global variables reqmedium and privmedium to denote the network. The type of reqmedium is For each record type, the second field holds a message to be transferred, and the first field indicates whether or not the cell contains a message.
Types Request and Privilege denote request and privilege messages, respectively. Request is declared as 
Specifying the Behavior of each Node
The behavior of each node is written in module node, which has a parameter i whose type is Node Id. In addition to the two global variables representing the network, namely reqmedium and privmedium, the following local variables are declared: requesting whose type is BOOLEAN, have privilege whose type is BOOLEAN, rn whose type is ARRAY Node Id OF Bnat, ln whose type is ARRAY Node Id OF Bnat, queue whose type is Queue, idx whose type is Node Id, pc whose type is Label, where Type Label is an enumeration type whose values correspond to the 12 labels such as rem and l1, and num of req whose type is Bnat. of the guarded command. The guarded commands corresponding to the 13 transitions are asynchronously composed to specify the behavior of each node as follows
Some transition is written as multiple guarded commands that are asynchronously composed as follows:
which is equivalent to
where Ì is ½ AE . ËÃ has the mutual exclusion property and the lockout freedom property. The properties are written as the assertions labeled mutex and lofree, respectively, shown in Fig. 3 . G and F are LTL temporal operators Henceforth (Always) and Eventually, respectively. We use the assumption that weak fairness is given to each of wait priv and receive req transitions to check the lockout freedom property. SMC concludes that mutex holds for Ë ¾ ¾ ¾ ËÃ , namely system such that Ä ¾ , Å ¾ and AE ¾ , but presents a counterexample to lofree.
A counterexample generated by a SAL model checker is composed of two lists È and Ä of pairs, each of which consists of a state (assignments to system variables) and the label of the guarded command applied to reach the state of the next pair. The next of the last pair of È is the first of Ä and the next of the last pair of Ä is the first of Ä. È corresponds to a finite path beginning in an initial state and leading to a loop represented by Ä. The loop represents a state or a transition sequence that violates a given formula. Figure 4 shows an excerpted counterexample to the lockout freedom generated by SMC. The counterexample says 
Step that if node 1 receives a request message from node 2 at l10, then node 2 may have to wait for a privilege message forever at l5. When node 1 receives a request message from node 2 at l10, node 1 does not transfer the privilege to node 2 because its requesting is true. If node 1 will not execute procedure P1 anymore, node 1 will never transfer the privilege to node2 and node 2 will wait for a privilege message forever.
The counterexample suggests that each node should not receive any request messages at l10. Therefore, the condition NOT(pc = l10) is added to the guard of receive. But this is not sufficient. Two more performances of model checking have us notice that NOT(pc = l8) and NOT(pc = l7) should also be added to the guard. SMC The property to be analyzed is the mutual exclusion property. We can use infBMC to search for a counterexample to mutex no longer than some specified depth, say 10. infBMC concludes that there are no counterexamples in the specified range. The structure of the verification with -induction would be useful when we verify that the infinite model involving an arbitrary number of nodes has the mutual exclusion property with a theorem prover such as PVS [8] . In other words, we would need the two lemmas to verify that Ë Ä ½ AE ËÃ involving an arbitrary number AE of nodes has the property.
Actually, when we verified it in a semi-formal way [7] , we used two lemmas that were almost the same as lemma1 and lemma2.
Conclusion
We reported on a case study in which SAL model checkers, precisely SMC and infBMC, have been used to analyze the Suzuki-Kasami algorithm with respect to the mutual exclusion property and the lockout freedom property. In the case study, we have found out one possible modification that makes the algorithm lockout free even if some nodes try to enter their critical sections only finitely often.
